Iran’s missiles “are both military weapons and political weapons,” said Taleblu, adding that simply developing and flight-testing the missiles was designed to send a political message, while their use, particularly in the hands of Iran’s proxy forces in the region, “is designed to affect local outcomes.” These developments are significant because Iranian leaders have assessed that irregular warfare— including support to non-state partners—is a critical element to competing with the United States in the region.Tehran wields influence in the Middle East through its use of non-state partners, despite renewed U.S. sanctions against Iran and a U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal.Yet Iran—and the IRGC-QF in particular—have vulnerabilities and weaknesses that may be exploitable, such as possible long-term overextension with an already weak economy and continuing divisions among Iraq’s Shia community about Iran and its doctrine of velayat-e faqih (the Islamic system of clerical rule). The war in Syria contributed to a significant rise, particularly by 2014, as Lebanese Hezbollah deployed fighters and Iran trained, equipped, and funded Shia militias from across the region to support the struggling Assad regime. The IRGC-QF’s relationship with these actors varies considerably, and in many cases is more of a partnership than a malleable patron-client relationship.Today, the IRGC-QF is active in building, funding, training, and partnering Figure 2 shows trends in the size of IRGC-QF partners in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Lebanon. Iran is largely isolated in the region. Capabilities. Iran is also attempting to establish land corridors across the region and increase its ability to move fighters and material from one theater to another.More broadly, there is a growing regional conflict with Iran, which consists of a war in Yemen (including the Houthi use of ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia), an escalating conflict with Israel in Syria, a growth of Shia militia forces in Iraq, targeted assassinations, and cyberattacks. First, there has been an increase in the number of Shia fighters. (Iran gained some of its Russian-made aircraft when the Iraqi military flewIran’s ability to modernize its armed forces has been hobbled by a Western arms embargo and a United Nations ban on selling conventional weapons to the Islamic Republic. There has been an increase in the size and capabilities of militias supported by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen collectively.

Today,In Lebanon, the IRGC-QF’s chief partner, Hezbollah, has improved its military capabilities and become more involved in the government.The Houthi threat has increased because of Iran’s proliferation of missiles, missile technology, and missile parts.Around 2016, as the war in Yemen intensified due to the growing involvement of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Iran began increasing its aid to the Houthis. These capabilities include the Quds Force and its network of Shiite militias, as well as what a Brookings InstitutionDating back to the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, there has been “an aura about missiles in Iranian political and military culture,” Taleblu said. Out of necessity, therefore, Iran has focused its resources and energies on developing what the Pentagon calls “asymmetric” capabilities that allow Iran to counter its enemies’ strong conventional forces. Its closeness to the regime and perceived ideological purity means the IRGC has the larger share of the military budget and gets the better equipment, making it “the star of Iran’s military,” Taleblu said.

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